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BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
                     
*.  The Honorable John R. Padova, United States District Judge 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
 
 
 This appeal is from an order of the district court 
dismissing with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), the products liability personal injury complaint of 
plaintiffs, some forty-nine former employees of Engelhard 
Corporation's manufacturing plant in Newark, New Jersey.  
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that between 1971 and 1982, while 
working for Engelhard, they contracted pulmonary injury as the 
result of their exposure to hazardous "airborne silica particles" 
supplied by defendant E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company, and 
released during Engelhard's metal reclamation process.  With the 
exception of John Wojenski, all the plaintiffs had previously 
sued DuPont, alleging that they had sustained pulmonary disease 
from asbestos exposure to the same material during the same 
period.1  That suit resulted in summary judgment for DuPont, 
which we affirmed on appeal in an unpublished opinion.  See 
Bradley v. DuPont, No. 91-5206 (3d Cir. Dec. 24, 1991) cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1706 (1992). 
 The district court concluded that plaintiffs' present 
lawsuit was barred by New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine, 
                     
1.  From 1970 to 1982, DuPont sent to Engelhard the waste product 
of DuPont's manufacture of hydrogen peroxide at its Memphis, 
Tennessee plant, a portion of which consisted of used filter 
pads.  The pads were shipped to Engelhard for the recovery of 
palladium, a precious metal which was used as a catalyst in 
DuPont's manufacturing process.  Engelhard's reclamation process 
consisted primarily of the incineration of the waste product in 
large furnaces, which, plaintiffs allege, released toxic smoke, 
dust, ash, and soot into their working environment.  In 1983, 
Engelhard learned that the filter pads contained ten percent 
asbestos.  Three years later, plaintiffs (except for Wojenski) 
initiated their first lawsuit, alleging that they had contracted 
pulmonary disease due to asbestos exposure from this material. 
 
 
and the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  Plaintiffs contended 
that they are not bound by the prior adverse judgment because:  
(1) their allegations of exposure to silica constitute a 
different cause of action, which was not and could not have been 
part of the earlier suit; and (2) they had brought new claims 
(for fraud and misrepresentation, medical surveillance, and 
emotional distress), which also were not considered in the prior 
action.  The court rejected these contentions. 
 The case had metamorphosed from one alleging asbestos 
exposure to one alleging silica exposure based on a chemist's 
report stating that asbestos decomposes after incineration into 
the substances forsterite and silica.  Plaintiffs learned of this 
theory during the prior proceedings in the district court, 
whereupon they sought to amend their complaint to allege silica 
exposure, but the district court denied their motion and our 
earlier opinion affirmed that denial.   
 The district court's order dismissing the complaints in 
the instant case was plainly correct with respect to all the 
plaintiffs but Wojenski.  Both res judicata and the New Jersey 
entire controversy doctrine bar those claims, and we will affirm 
that portion of the order without discussion.  However, we reach 
a different result as to Wojenski, who was not a party to the 
prior action.  We find defendant's contention, accepted by the 
district court, that Wojenski's claim is barred because he was in 
privity with the other plaintiffs, to be fatally flawed.  
 None of the three potential ways in which Wojenski 
might be bound by the earlier judgment applies here.  First, the 
 
 
earlier plaintiffs might have been "virtual representatives" of 
Wojenski, but that is not the case because no legal relationship 
entitled the prior plaintiffs to represent Wojenski.  Second, 
Wojenski might have controlled the prior litigation, but there is 
no such evidence.  Third, the prior litigation might have been 
considered a class action and Wojenski a member of the class, but 
the district court did not certify the prior action as a class 
action and did not provide notice to prospective plaintiffs.  We 
will therefore vacate the district court's order as to Wojenski 
and remand for further proceedings. 
 
 I. 
 Under New Jersey law, which applies here, claim and 
issue preclusion only apply to parties or to those in privity 
with them.  See Wunschel v. City of Jersey City, 477 A.2d 329, 
333 (N.J. 1984).  In the famous words of Judge Goodrich: 
"[P]rivity states no reason for including or excluding one from 
the estoppel of a judgment.  It is merely a word used to say that 
the relationship between the one who is a party on the record and 
another is close enough to include that other within the res 
judicata."  Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3d 
Cir. 1950) (Goodrich, J., concurring), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 
865, 71 S. Ct. 87 (1950), quoted in part in Moore v. Hafeeza, 515 
A.2d 271, 274 (N.J. Super. 1986). 
 A relationship is usually considered "close enough" 
only when the party is a virtual representative of the non-party, 
 
 
or when the non-party actually controls the litigation.  As the 
New Jersey Superior Court explained in Moore: 
 Generally, one person is in privity with 
another and is bound by and entitled to the 
benefits of a judgment as though he was a 
party when there is such an identification of 
interest between the two as to represent the 
same legal right, or if a person who is not a 
party controls or substantially participates 
in the control of the presentation on behalf 
of a party, Restatement, Judgments 2d, § 39, 
or if a person who is not a party to an 
action is represented by a party, including 
an "official or agency invested by law with 
authority to represent the person's 
interests."  Id. § 41(d). 
 
515 A.2d at 273 (citation omitted).  The scope of privity, while 
largely freed from the very constrictive common law mutuality 
anchor, remains small.  See generally Romano v. Kimmelman, 464 
A.2d 1170, 1174-75 (N.J. Super. 1983), aff'd, 474 A.2d 1 (N.J. 
1984).     
 
 A. Virtual Representation 
  
 Virtual representation does not mean merely that 
someone in the suit serves the interests of the person outside 
the suit.  It requires a relationship by which the party in the 
suit is the legally designated representative of the non-party, 
as is made clear from the examples in the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments.  Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 41 (1982), which 
has been followed by the New Jersey Superior Court, see Moore, 
515 A.2d at 273, reads: 
 
 
 A person who is not a party to an action but 
who is represented by a party is bound by and 
entitled to the benefits of a judgment as 
though he were a party.  A person is 
represented by a party who is: 
  
  (a) The trustee of an estate or 
interest of which the person is a 
beneficiary; or 
  
  (b) Invested by the person with 
authority to represent him in an 
action; or 
 
  (c) The executor, administrator, 
guardian, conservator, or similar 
fiduciary manager of an interest of 
which the person is a beneficiary; 
or  
 
  (d) An official or agency invested 
by law with authority to represent 
the person's interests; or 
 
  (e) The representative of a class 
of persons similarly situated, 
designated as such with the 
approval of the court, of which the 
person is a member. 
 
 Applying § 41(d), some New Jersey Superior Court cases, 
as well as some of our own cases, find privity situations where a 
government agency is the designated representative of a group of 
individuals.  See E.I.B. v. J.R.B., 611 A.2d 662, 663 (N.J. 
Super. 1992) (an unsuccessful paternity action brought by a 
mother bars a subsequent action brought by the child because, 
under a New Jersey statute, the mother represents the child), 
certification denied, 617 A.2d 1223 (1992); Equal Employment 
Opportunity Comm'n. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 495-96 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (under the statutory scheme, the Equal Employment 
 
 
Opportunity Commission is the legal representative of the private 
individuals, and where an individual sues first and has his or 
her day in court, his or her representative cannot sue later on 
the same claim).  Like § 41(c) of the Restatement, our cases also 
include fiduciary managers of organizations of which an 
individual is a member.  See Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 
578 F.2d 912, 918 (3d Cir. 1978) (members of a labor organization 
are bound by a consent decree when the organization adequately 
represented them).  Thus, all of the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments examples, New Jersey cases, and our cases finding 
privity have done so when there is a pre-existing legal 
relationship by which a party represents a non-party. 
 A pre-existing legal relationship is not only a 
sufficient condition for privity to exist, but it is also a 
necessary one.  See E.I.B., 611 A.2d at 663 ("Privity generally 
involves a party to earlier litigation so identified with a party 
to later litigation that they represent the same legal right."); 
cf. Rutgers Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dickerson, 521 A.2d 373, 376 
(N.J. Super. 1987) ("privity in this context [of claim 
preclusion] requires some legal connection between the parties 
such as succession to the same rights to property").  No pre-
existing legal relationship existed here.  Wojenski had no 
relationship with the plaintiffs in the first suit other than the 
fact that they all worked at the same place. 
 The fact that Wojenski has the same interest as the 
prior plaintiffs and is joined in a suit with those plaintiffs is 
insufficient to create privity between Wojenski and the prior 
 
 
plaintiffs.  In In Re Dawson, 641 A.2d 1026, 1036 (N.J. 1994), 
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the rule governing 
accounting of a particular trust, a rule established in prior 
intermediate accountings of the same trust, could be relitigated 
because the unborn beneficiaries, who were parties to this 
accounting, had not been parties to the prior accountings.  The 
court explained, "[a]lthough other beneficiaries were represented 
by a guardian ad litem and were parties to those prior 
accountings, that those beneficiaries may have had interests 
similar to the interests of the unborn beneficiaries does not 
establish privity between them for purposes of collateral 
estoppel."  Id.   
 Similarly, in Eatough v. Board of Medical Examiners, 
465 A.2d 934, 939 (N.J. Super. 1983), the New Jersey Superior 
Court held that where Dr. Eatough, one of four plaintiffs, had 
litigated the same issues previously, preclusion did not apply to 
the remaining three plaintiffs.  The court stated:  "[T]heir 
rights do not derive from [Dr. Eatough's] in any way.  While 
there may be an identity of interests between the four plaintiffs 
here, the record does not permit the conclusion that Dr. Eatough 
was the representative of the other plaintiffs in the [prior] 
litigation." Id.2  Thus, as a leading treatise summarizes, "[t]he 
                     
2.   One New Jersey Superior Court case implies that an identity 
of interests may suffice in certain contexts to create privity.  
In Moore, the court held that "it appears to be the modern rule 
that privity should be applied when: 1. The claim of the nonparty 
is based on the same transaction or occurrence, 2. The interests 
of both claimants are similar and no adverse interests exist, 3.  
The nonparty had notice of the earlier action, and 4. The 
 
 
bare fact that one plaintiff is joined with others who were 
parties and who can properly be bound by a prior proceeding does 
not justify preclusion of the nonparty plaintiff as well."  
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4449, at 416 
(1981). 
 Nor does the fact that Wojenski had the same attorney 
as the plaintiffs in the first suit make preclusion appropriate. 
In Benson & Ford, Inc. v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 833 F.2d 1172, 
1174-76 (5th Cir. 1987), for example, the fact that plaintiffs in 
the second suit were represented by the same attorney as 
plaintiffs in the first suit and that one of the plaintiffs had 
testified in the first suit was not enough to establish privity.  
In the court's view, the plaintiffs in the second suit must have 
exercised control in the first suit or been virtually represented 
in the first suit; the latter theory requires an express or 
implied legal relationship in which parties to the first suit 
were accountable to non-parties who file the second suit.3 
(..continued) 
nonparty did or had an opportunity to participate or intervene in 
the earlier case."  515 A.2d at 274. 
 But this statement is in significant tension with the 
New Jersey cases holding that similarity of interests do not 
create privity.  Moreover, the statement is dicta because in 
Moore, privity existed as a result of the fact that the county 
board of social services, which had lost a paternity suit, was 
the statutory representative of the mother who now wanted to sue. 
515 A.2d at 274.  Finally, we note that even if the Moore rule 
were the law, Wojenski's suit would not be barred, because, not 
having discovered his injury until the earlier suit was 
dismissed, Wojenski did not have an opportunity to participate in 
the earlier Bradley case.  
3.  Some courts seemingly have taken a broader view of virtual 
representation, although we think that these cases can be 
explained as consistent with the general pattern.  In Alpert's 
 
 
 Moreover, allowing Wojenski to continue his suit is the 
right result -- every individual is entitled to his or her day in 
court.  See 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward 
M. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4449, at 417 (1981) 
("Our deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have 
his own day in court draws from the clear experience with the 
general fallibility of litigation and with the specific 
distortions of judgment that arise from the very identity of the 
parties.")  Unless the individual chose another party to 
(..continued) 
Newspaper Delivery Inc. v. New York Times Co., 876 F.2d 266, 270-
71 (2d Cir. 1989), a number of independent newspaper delivery 
companies, which were members of a trade association, sued the 
New York Times.  The Times prevailed, and then other independent 
companies, also members of the trade association, sued.  The 
Second Circuit held that the suit was barred by collateral 
estoppel because the association, which had financed both suits 
and provided litigation strategies for the complaints, was the 
ultimate force behind the litigation.  In short, the court found 
that the second set of plaintiffs had been previously adequately 
represented by another who had been vested with the authority of 
representation.  And in Ruiz v. Commissioner of Dep't of Transp., 
858 F.2d 898, 903 (2d Cir. 1988), the court held that where two 
groups of truck drivers filed suits with identical allegations, 
the attorney was the same, and there was evidence of a strategy 
coordinated by an Industry Fund, preclusion applied.  The court 
reasoned that "[a]lthough not conclusive on the issue of privity, 
the fact that the parties in Manno and in this case had the same 
attorney in actions brought at about the same time is of 
`singular significance'".  However, in these cases, especially in 
New York Times, the Second Circuit essentially held that the 
Trade Association and Industry Fund had been parties to the first 
suits, and that these organizations were virtual representatives 
of the plaintiffs, who had pre-existing relationships with these 
organizations, in the second suit.  And in Ruiz, the common 
attorney filed the two lawsuits at roughly the same time, and 
there was significant evidence that the plaintiffs in the second 
suit controlled the first suit as part of an overarching 




represent him or her in the prior suit or a law designated an 
agent as his or her representative, the outcome of a prior 
lawsuit in which the individual did not take part should not bind 
him or her.  The fact that the plaintiff's attorney took part in 
a prior, similar action is irrelevant unless there is evidence 
that the plaintiff was, through his or her attorney, actually 
participating in the prior suit.  Otherwise, we will inhibit the 
free choice of attorneys and prevent attorneys from developing an 
expertise through concentration in certain types of litigation. 
  
 B. Control 
  
 A second reason for finding privity is if a non-party 
controlled the prior lawsuit.  The Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 39 (1982) states:  "A person who is not a party to an 
action but who controls or substantially participates in the 
control of the presentation on behalf of a party is bound by the 
determination of issues decided as though he were a party."  See 
Moore, 515 A.2d at 273 (stating that substantial participation in 
the control of a suit creates privity); United States v. Webber, 
396 F.2d 381, 386-87 (3d Cir. 1968) (holding that defendants were 
in privity with prior litigants because they controlled the prior 
suit).  But here there is utterly no evidence that Wojenski 
controlled the prior lawsuit.  In fact, Wojenski asserts that his 
injuries did not even develop until after the first suit was 
dismissed.  Cf. Duncan v. Blacksburg, 364 F.Supp. 643, 645 (D.C. 
Va. 1973) "[W]hile it may well be that 13 of the 17 plaintiffs 
 
 
are bound by res adjudicata, 4 of them are not, because they were 
not parties to the suit or privies.  They took no part and had no 
laboring oar.").   
 
 C. Class Action  
 
 The last category of virtual representation listed in 
the Restatement of Judgments is class representation.  If the 
first action was a class action and Wojenski was a part of the 
class, then he is bound by the results.  The complaint in the 
original suit makes it appear that the suit was intended to be a 
class action.  The complaint states that  
 [t]his action is brought on behalf of the 
plaintiffs, as well as on behalf of each and 
all other persons similarly situated.   
JA 23.  However, the district court never held a class 
certification hearing, certified a class, or made reference to a 
class.  Yet, in dismissing the current action, the court 
indicated that in essence it had been treating the earlier action 
as a class action: 
 Although the plaintiffs in Bradley were not 
certified as a class pursuant to Rule 23, 
plaintiffs' counsel in Bradley held 
themsel[ves] out as representing all present 
and former employees of Englehardt, allegedly 
exposed to the hazardous material at issue.  
This representation was acknowledged by the 
Court in its October 19th, 1990 memorandum 
and order granting DuPont's motion for 
summary judgment.  
 
Transcript of Motion Hearing at 26 [A 78] (Nov. 15, 1993).   
 
 
Thus, we are faced with the question whether a potential class 
member can be bound by a prior suit that the district court later 
determines was essentially a class action. 
 Perhaps in some circumstances we would consider a prior 
action to constitute a class action for preclusion purposes even 
without formal class treatment in that action.  See Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedures § 4455, at 476 ("[t]he 
most obvious limitation is that there must actually have been a 
class action, although formal failure to certify an action that 
is in fact treated by all parties as a class action may not 
defeat class preclusion"); Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 
F.2d 432, 435 (5th Cir. 1979) (where the district court in the 
prior action never formally certified the class but did state 
that plaintiff's suit was under federal class action rules and 
explained who constituted the class, and where the court of 
appeals treated the prior action as a class action under Rule 
23(b)(2), the prior action was a class action with res judicata 
effect on class members).   
 Unlike Johnson, however, the district court in the 
original suit here did not suggest that it was treating the suit 
as a class action.  This means that if the district court had 
ruled favorably to the plaintiff, Wojenski would not have 
automatically benefitted from that outcome, and hence it would be 
unfair to bind him to an outcome unfavorable to him.  Moreover, 
because the district court did not certify a class, it did not 
delineate the boundaries of the class.  Therefore, even if the 
prior suit was effectively a class action, we do not know if 
 
 
Wojenski, who discovered his injury after the Bradley suit was 
dismissed, would have been within the class and bound by its 
results.   
 Third, and most important, we do not know if the 
district court would have certified the class as a Rule 23 
(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3) class.  Because the plaintiffs were 
asking for damages rather than injunctive or declaratory relief,   
we have little doubt that the appropriate type of class action 
here would have been a Rule 23(b)(3) class since we have no 
reason to believe that a decision with respect to some class 
members would have impeded the ability of others to protect their 
interests.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).  But if the district court 
had certified such a class, Wojenski would have had to receive 
notice and an opportunity to opt out before he could be bound.  
In Johnson, despite concluding that formal class certification 
was not required to bind plaintiffs on some issues, the Fifth 
Circuit held that before a class member "may be forever barred 
from pursuing an individual damage claim, . . . due process 
requires that he receive some form of notice that the class 
action is pending and that his damage claims may be adjudicated 
as part of it."  598 F.2d at 435 (emphasis added). 
 In sum, absent far greater indications that Bradley was 
a mandatory class action, Wojenski is not bound by the results of 
that action.  By not joining the earlier law suit, he in essence 
opted for his own day in court.  
 The order of the district court as to Wojenski will be 
reversed, and his case remanded for further proceedings.  In all 
 
 
other respects, the order of the district court will be affirmed.  
Parties to bear their own costs. 
